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Cambridge University Press, Philosophy of Science, 2(88), p. 213-233, 2021

DOI: 10.1086/711501

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Why Simpler Computer Simulation Models Can Be Epistemically Better for Informing Decisions

Journal article published in 2020 by Casey Helgeson, Vivek Srikrishnan ORCID, Klaus Keller, Nancy Tuana
This paper was not found in any repository, but could be made available legally by the author.
This paper was not found in any repository, but could be made available legally by the author.

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Abstract

For computer simulation models to usefully inform climate risk management, uncertainties in model projections must be explored and characterized. Because doing so requires running the model many times over, and because computing resources are finite, uncertainty assessment is more feasible using models that demand less computer processor time. Such models are generally simpler in the sense of being more idealized, or less realistic. So modelers face a trade-off between realism and uncertainty quantification. Seeing this trade-off for the important epistemic issue that it is requires a shift in perspective from the established simplicity literature in philosophy of science.