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Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, p. 191-199, 2010

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_11

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On Some Incompatible Properties of Voting Schemes

Proceedings article published in 2010 by Benoît Chevallier-Mames, Pierre-Alain Fouque, David Pointcheval, Julien Stern, Jacques Traoré
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This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of simultaneously achieving several security properties, for voting schemes, without non-standard assumptions. More specifically, we focus on the universal veriability of the computation of the tally, on the unconditional privacy/anonymity of the votes, and on the receipt-freeness properties, for the most classical election processes. Under usual assumptions and efficiency requirements, we show that a voting system that wants to publish the final list of the voters who actually voted, and to compute the number of times each candidate has been chosen, we cannot achieve: - universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and unconditional privacy of the votes (UP) simultaneously, unless all the registered voters actually vote; - universal verifiability of the tally (UV) and receipt- freeness (RF), unless private channels are available between the voters and/or the voting authorities.