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Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, p. 308-326, 2011

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_17

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Cryptanalysis of ARMADILLO2

Proceedings article published in 2011 by Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Céline Blondeau, Maria Naya-Plasencia, Marion Videau, Erik Zenner
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.

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Abstract

ARMADILLO2 is the recommended variant of a multipurpose cryptographic primitive dedicated to hardware which has been proposed by Badel et al. in [1]. In this paper, we describe a meet-in-the-middle technique relying on the parallel matching algorithm that allows us to invert the ARMADILLO2 function. This makes it possible to perform a key recovery attack when used as a FIL-MAC. A variant of this attack can also be applied to the stream cipher derived from the PRNG mode. Finally we propose a (second) preimage attack when used as a hash function. We have validated our attacks by implementing cryptanalysis on scaled variants. The experimental results match the theoretical complexities. In addition to these attacks, we present a generalization of the parallel matching algorithm, which can be applied in a broader context than attacking ARMADILLO2.