本文旨在探討影響最終控制股東現金流量權槓桿之成因，驗證即使企業具相對較佳的減緩代理問題機制，最終控制股東現金流量權槓桿仍提高之理由，且以私人利益動機與風險趨避態度解釋此現象。實證結果顯示，負債比率，董事會規模與會計揭露品質雖能減緩代理問題，但並非與現金流量權槓桿呈現單調遞減，最終控制股東風險趨避態度使現金流量權槓桿程度不受減緩代理問題機制侷限而提高，且加劇最終控制股東操縱後現金流量權槓桿程度；考慮內生性後，私人利益動機使最終控制股東操縱現金流量權槓桿之意願更勝於減緩代理問題機制之效果，另外最終控制股東風險趨避態度亦使現金流量權槓桿程度不受減緩代理問題侷限，亦加劇操縱後現金流量權槓桿程度；最後，擴大構面以整體公司治理程度衡量減緩代理問題機制，結論與上述相同。 ; This paper mainly investigates the reasons that affect cash flow right leverage of controlling shareholder and verifies that cash flow right leverage of controlling shareholder may be increased even though enterprises relatively have remedies for agency problems. This phenomenon could be explained by private benefit and risk aversion. The results suggest that debt ratio, board size and accounting transparency can retard agency problems, but cash flow right leverage do not decay monotonously with them. Because of risk aversion of controlling shareholder, cash flow right leverage level of controlling shareholder is increased and it intensifies cash flow right leverage level which controlling shareholder has already manipulated even though enterprises relatively have remedies for agency problems. After considering endogenous, controlling shareholder tends to manipulate cash flow right leverage because of private benefit motive of controlling shareholder even though enterprises relatively have remedies for agency problems. The result also suggests that cash flow right leverage level of controlling shareholder is increased and cash flow right leverage level which controlling shareholder has already manipulated is intensified because of risk aversion of controlling shareholder. Finally, these conclusions are identical if remedy for agency problem is measured by corporate governance.