Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and later writings help psychologists to identify and work through “pictures” evoked and used in our linguistic practices especially when these representations appear to be self-evident and they promote fundamental misconceptions. This article applies Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to theories and accounts of combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods in psychology, many of which have now been extended to mixtures of qualitative methods with contrasting theoretical assumptions. In contrast to pragmatist, realist, and social constructionist stances, a Wittgensteinian approach examines metatheoretical and metamethodological pictures of methodological plurality in a treatment of issues that are traditionally explored in terms of epistemological, ontological, interpretative, and paradigm differences. Arguments that Wittgenstein’s work can strengthen existing forms of personal, methodological, and deconstructive reflexivity in psychological research practices are exemplified with a specific example of combining psychosocial and discursive qualitative methods.