Published in

Elsevier, Economics Letters, 2(122), p. 136-139, 2014

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

SSRN Electronic Journal

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2346832

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Second Thoughts on Free Riding

This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a largescale online Public Goods Game and nd that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma