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EPL Association, European Physical Society Letters, 3(63), p. 319-325

DOI: 10.1209/epl/i2003-00461-5

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Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games

Journal article published in 2002 by Luis Dinis, Juan M. R. Parrondo ORCID
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

We present a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where one is allowed to choose in each turn the game that a large number of individuals play. It turns out that, by choosing the game which gives the highest average earnings at each step, one ends up with systematic loses, whereas a periodic or random sequence of choices yields a steadily increase of the capital. An explanation of this behavior is given by noting that the short-range maximization of the returns is "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs". A continuous model displaying similar features is analyzed using dynamic programming techniques from control theory. ; Comment: 4 pages, 6 figures, revised version in published form