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Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society, 3(12), p. 1356-1366

DOI: 10.5762/kais.2011.12.3.1356

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Vulnerability Analysis of Insider Attack on TPM Command Authorization Protocol and Its Countermeasure

Journal article published in 2011 by Doo-Hwan Oh, Doo-Sik Choi, Ki-Hyun Kim, Soo-Hyun Oh, Jae-Cheol Ha
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.

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Abstract

The TPM(Trusted Platform Module) is a hardware chip to support a trusted computing environment. A rightful user needs a command authorization process in order to use principal TPM commands. To get command authorization from TPM chip, the user should perform the OIAP(Object-Independent Authorization Protocol) or OSAP(Object-Specific Authorization Protocol). Recently, Chen and Ryan alerted the vulnerability of insider attack on TPM command authorization protocol in multi-user environment and presented a countermeasure protocol SKAP(Session Key Authorization Protocol). In this paper, we simulated the possibility of insider attack on OSAP authorization protocol in real PC environment adopted a TPM chip. Furthermore, we proposed a novel countermeasure to defeat this insider attack and improve SKAP's disadvantages such as change of command suructures and need of symmetric key encryption algorithm. Our proposed protocol can prevent from insider attack by modifying of only OSAP command structure and adding of RSA encryption on user and decryption on TPM.