Dissemin is shutting down on January 1st, 2025

Published in

American Economic Association, American Economic Review, 11(105), p. 3416-3442

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141409

Links

Tools

Export citation

Search in Google Scholar

Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism.

Journal article published in 2015 by Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, Mariano Sigman ORCID
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

Full text: Download

Green circle
Preprint: archiving allowed
Green circle
Postprint: archiving allowed
Green circle
Published version: archiving allowed
Data provided by SHERPA/RoMEO

Abstract

In this paper we present the results from a “corruption game” (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient’s tokens, take more of them. They were also more likely to report believing that the recipient would accept a low price in exchange for a side payment; and selected larger numbers as their best guess of the likely proportion of recipients acting “unfairly”. The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.