Dissemin is shutting down on January 1st, 2025

Published in

Wiley, Public Administration Review, 6(72), p. 887-900, 2012

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02596.x

Links

Tools

Export citation

Search in Google Scholar

Outsourcing Public Service Delivery: Management Responses in Noncompetitive Markets

Journal article published in 2012 by Amanda M. Girth, Amir Hefetz, Jocelyn M. Johnston, Mildred E. Warner ORCID
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.

Full text: Download

Green circle
Preprint: archiving allowed
Orange circle
Postprint: archiving restricted
Red circle
Published version: archiving forbidden
Data provided by SHERPA/RoMEO

Abstract

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for-profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.