We explore a replicator–mutator model of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma involving three strategies: always cooperate (ALLC), always defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). The dynamics resulting from single unidirectional mutations are considered, with detailed results presented for the mutations TFT → ALLC and ALLD → ALLC. For certain combinations of parameters, given by the mutation rate μ and the complexity cost c of playing tit-for-tat, we find that the population settles into limit cycle oscillations, with the relative abundance of ALLC, ALLD, and TFT cycling periodically. Surprisingly, these oscillations can occur for unidirectional mutations between any two strategies. In each case, the limit cycles are created and destroyed by supercritical Hopf and homoclinic bifurcations, organized by a Bogdanov–Takens bifurcation. Our results suggest that stable oscillations are a robust aspect of a world of ALLC, ALLD, and costly TFT; the existence of cycles does not depend on the details of assumptions of how mutation is implemented.