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Secure RSA with CRT Protected Against Fault Attacks without using Checking Procedure

Journal article published in 2008 by Sung-Kyoung Kim, Tae-Hyun Kim, Dong-Guk Han, Young-Ho Park, Seok-Hie Hong
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Preprint: policy unknown
Question mark in circle
Postprint: policy unknown
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Published version: policy unknown

Abstract

Because Chinese Remainder Theorem based RSA (RSA CRT) offers a faster version of modular exponentiation than ordinary repeated squaring, it is promoting with standard. Unfortunately there are major security issues associated with RSA CRT, since Bellcore announced a fault-based cryptanalysis against RSA CRT in 1996. In 1997, Shamir developed a countermeasure using error free immune checking procedure. And soon it became known that the this checking procedure can not effect as the countermeasures. Recently Yen proposed two hardware fault immune protocols for RSA CRT, and this two protocols do not assume the existence of checking procedure. However, in FDTC 2006, the method of attack against the Yen's two protocols was introduced. In this paper, the main purpose is to present a countermeasure against the method of attack from FDTC 2006 for CRT-RSA. The proposed countermeasure use a characteristic bit operation and dose not consider an additional operation.