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Cambridge University Press, Public Health Nutrition, 1(25), p. 170-179, 2021

DOI: 10.1017/s136898002100149x

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Sugary drinks taxation: industry’s lobbying strategies, practices and arguments in the Brazilian Legislature

Journal article published in 2021 by Aline Brandão Mariath ORCID, Ana Paula Bortoletto Martins ORCID
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.
This paper is made freely available by the publisher.

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Abstract

AbstractObjective:To assess the strategies, practices and arguments used by the industry to lobby legislators against sugary drinks taxation in Brazil.Design:We performed a content analysis of arguments put forward by sugary drink and sugar industries against sugary drinks taxation, using the framework developed by the International Network for Food and Obesity/Non-Communicable Diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support to assess corporate political activity of the food industry.Setting:Two public hearings held in 2017 and 2018 in the Brazilian Legislature.Participants:Representatives from two prominent industry associations – one representing Big Soda and the other representing the main sugar, ethanol and bioelectricity producers.Results:The ‘Information and messaging’ and ‘Policy substitution’ strategies were identified. Five practices were identified in the ‘Information and messaging’ strategy (four described in the original framework and an additional practice, ‘Stress the environmental importance of the industry’). Mechanisms not included in the original framework identified were ‘Stress the reduction of CO2emissions promoted by the industry’; ‘Question the effectiveness of regulation’; ‘Suggest public-private partnerships’; ‘Shift the blame away from the product’ and ‘Question sugary drinks taxation as a public health recommendation’. No new practices or mechanisms to the original framework emerged in the ‘Policy substitution’ strategy.Conclusions:The strategies and practices are used collectively and complement each other. Arguments herein identified are in line with those reported in other countries under different contexts and using different methodologies. Future research should address whether and under what conditions lobbying from this industry sector is effective in the Brazilian Legislature.