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Elsevier, Games and Economic Behavior, 2(22), p. 274-298

DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0589

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Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria

Journal article published in 1998 by Philippe Jehiel
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

This paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles such that (1) players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts and (2) forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning process involving (vanishing) trembles.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83.