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Cambridge University Press, Economics and Philosophy, 1(39), p. 124-151, 2022

DOI: 10.1017/s0266267121000365

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Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare

Journal article published in 2022 by João V. Ferreira ORCID
This paper was not found in any repository, but could be made available legally by the author.
This paper was not found in any repository, but could be made available legally by the author.

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Abstract

AbstractRecently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based on context-independent choices and the other based on reason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments for nudges and boosts.