Few academically rigorous accounts exist of the financial activities that sustained the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the Northern Ireland Troubles. Through a sustained methodology this study seeks to challenge some popular preconceptions and address omissions in the limited historical record. The paper explores the organization’s evolving financial sophistication by analyzing PIRA’s acquisition of capital rather than its arms dealings. Using a new quantitative evaluation, this investigation confronts the prevailing understanding that Irish-American funds were of unrivalled significance to PIRA. It points to an array of domestic fund-raisers that collectively provided the overwhelming bulk of revenue. The study reveals also how PIRA developed an extensive reliance on criminal gangs for its expertise in illegal fund-raising, suggesting that moneymaking schemes were perceived as a necessary but unpopular by-product of the greater political objective. Finally, this paper briefly explores how the British authorities sought to interdict PIRA’s funding. While the general perception is that little was done to counteract PIRA’s financing initiatives in the early phases of its violent campaign, this study, nevertheless, reveals that a subtle counter-finance initiative did take place in Belfast across the 1970s. Overall, the analysis enables a more rounded comprehension of the group’s financial resilience.