Published in
Elsevier, Information Processing Letters, 9(115), p. 660-666, 2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.ipl.2015.03.008
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Impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192
Journal article published in 2015 by
Céline Blondeau
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Abstract
In this paper, we study the security of the block ciphers Camellia-192 and Camellia-256 in the impossible differential context. In particular, we present the first attack on 13 rounds of Camellia-192 with layers. An attack on 14 rounds of Camellia-256 requiring less complexity than the previous impossible differential attacks is also described.