Most strategies of engagement with Vietnam are premised upon the assumption that Vietnam's development success shows that the Party is governing, rather than simply ruling: that is, that change has in the main come from correct and implemented policy. This position is supported by much of the 'knowledge production' derived from aid programs. • Much academic writing, as well as day-to-day experience, suggests that this assumption is flawed: development success has been caused by social and economic factors, rather than policy. The Party continues, at root, to rule rather than govern. • Vietnamese society is changing very fast, and this creates severe problems for Vietnamese reformers who wish to re-establish executive power and shift 'from rule to government'. Residual Leninism is pervasive. • Most aid programs, both INGO and ODA, work through formal, official structures. This has created a situation of relative ignorance about social change, often obscured by ill-founded but convenient worries about the political sensitivity of ideas of 'peaceful evolution' and 'civil society'. • This leads to two major risks: first, that as discussions increasingly focus upon 'civil society', far too little stress is placed upon underlying social change compared with state: society relations; second, that continuing support for formal structures as the central element of interventions ends up reinforcing conservative trends. • So far as we can tell, it is donor concerns, rather than those on the Vietnamese side, that currently drive focus upon state: society relations rather than underlying social change, or 'cuoc song'. • There is therefore need for fundamental rethinking about how to engage with change in Vietnam.