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Petty Despots and Executive Officials: Civil-Military Relations in the Early American Navy

Published in 2010 by Thomas Sheppard
This paper was not found in any repository; the policy of its publisher is unknown or unclear.
This paper was not found in any repository; the policy of its publisher is unknown or unclear.

Full text: Unavailable

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Preprint: policy unknown
Question mark in circle
Postprint: policy unknown
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Published version: policy unknown

Abstract

As a new nation, the United States lacked the long naval traditions of the other powers of the time, particularly Great Britain. When Congress created a naval force in 1794, the country had to rely on its first officers to form the traditions of the service and lay the foundations of the American Navy. These first officers bequeathed to their country the naval force that would eventually challenge the mighty Royal Navy in the War of 1812. However, officers alone were not responsible for the maturation of the Navy. Civilian officials, notably the Secretary of the Navy, also played a major role in the development of an American maritime force. These two components did not always interact harmoniously. Captains, used to the total autonomy that command at sea in an era of starkly limited communication created, often had difficulty subordinating themselves to their civilian superiors. During the first three decades of the Navy’s existence, successive Secretaries of the Navy would gradually increase their authority over their officers, establishing the traditions of civilian control over the military that had long been a part of land warfare. This thesis explores the process whereby the question of ultimate authority over the Navy was settled, beginning with the creation of the navy and culminating in the creation of the Board of Naval Commissioners following the War of 1812.