Published in

Philosophy Documentation Center, Philosophical Studies, 2021

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-021-01716-y

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One or two? A Process View of pregnancy

Journal article published in 2021 by Anne Sophie Meincke ORCID
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

AbstractHow many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.