It is without a doubt that botnets pose a growing threat to the Internet, with DDoS attacks of any kind carried out by botnets to be on the rise. Nowadays, botmasters rely on advanced Command & Control (C&C) infrastructures to achieve their goals and most importantly to remain undetected. This work introduces two novel botnet architectures that consist only of mobile devices and evaluates both their impact in terms of DNS amplification and TCP flooding attacks, and their cost pertaining to the maintenance of the C&C channel. The first one, puts forward the idea of using a continually-changing mobile HTTP proxy in front of the botherder, while the other capitalizes on DNS protocol as a covert channel for coordinating the botnet. That is, for the latter, the messages exchanged among the bots and the herder appear as legitimate DNS transactions. Also, a third architecture is described and assessed, which is basically an optimized variation of the first one. Namely, it utilizes a mixed layout where all the attacking bots are mobile, but the proxy machines are typical PCs not involved in the actual attack. For the DNS amplification attack, which is by nature more powerful, we report an amplification factor that fluctuates between 32.7 and 34.1. Also, regarding the imposed C&C cost, we assert that it is minimal (about 0.25 Mbps) per bot in the worst case happening momentarily when the bot learns about the parameters of the attack.