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Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, p. 624-643, 2005

DOI: 10.1007/11593447_34

New York; London; Springer, Advances in Information Security, p. 1-17

DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-87969-7_8

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Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols

Proceedings article published in 2005 by Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo ORCID, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchcock
This paper is available in a repository.
This paper is available in a repository.

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Abstract

Proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. However, several instances of undetected a ws in the proofs of protocols (resulting in a wed protocols) undermine the credibility of provably-secure protocols. In this work, we examine several protocols with claimed proofs of security by Boyd & Gonz alez Nieto (2003), Jakobsson & Pointcheval (2001), and Wong & Chan (2001), and an authenticator by Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk (1998). Using these protocols as case studies, we reveal previously un- published a ws in these protocols and their proofs. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future.